Recently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Finance and other ministries and commissions have intensively introduced a number of real estate regulation and control policies within half a month: from "changing the business tax collection from 2 to 5" to "the four national articles", to "the down payment for land acquisition is not less than 50%", from "collecting business tax on the transfer price difference of ordinary housing within five years" to "supervising the national idle real estate land 18 cases". However, relevant regulation and control measures may be taken. Because these measures not only failed to solve the fundamental problem, but also bred new problems-this is also proved by the effect of previous real estate regulation and control, almost every time after real estate regulation and control, there will be a new round of retaliatory price increases. On February 23, 65438, when interviewed by CCTV's Today Watch, I made two suggestions (only the first one was broadcast): First, adjust the current tax-sharing system. After the tax-sharing reform, the financial power of local governments has decreased, but the power of affairs has increased. Local governments should not only develop the economy, but also provide adequate public services and products, but they are faced with the problem of lack of funds. At present, local governments basically fill this funding gap through land transfer fees and real estate-related taxes. Therefore, from the perspective of interest-driven, local governments have no incentive to curb housing prices. There is a simple reason. When house prices go up, land prices go up, and local governments can get more land transfer income. No matter how severe the real estate control measures are, they will eventually be implemented by local governments. Due to interest factors, local governments will only obey the sun and not the sun when implementing real estate regulation and control. Therefore, to solve this problem from the root, we must adjust the tax-sharing system and increase the fiscal revenue of local governments. Only when its financial resources are guaranteed can we really implement measures to curb the rise in housing prices. The second is to change the current official performance evaluation criteria. At present, the achievements of cadres are mainly assessed by GDP. In order to get a higher GDP growth rate, local officials have more incentive to push up land prices and housing prices, so as to enhance the investment capacity of capital construction, push up GDP and get more and better promotion opportunities. As long as this deformed cadre performance evaluation standard does not change, the motivation of local officials to promote housing prices will never weaken. GDP is only an indicator to quantify economic activities. Most countries in the world pursue the improvement of people's happiness index, not GDP. Many officials in China put the cart before the horse, and regard GDP as the only goal under the abnormal assessment system. Imagine, under this assessment standard, which official can really care about people's livelihood? Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the assessment criteria for officials as soon as possible. Because these two suggestions are not taken seriously at present, it will inevitably lead to the abnormal outcome of the more regulated housing prices. Take the land "heavy punch" as an example. 65438+February 65438+July, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Land and Resources and other five ministries and commissions issued the Notice on Further Strengthening the Management of Land Transfer Revenue and Expenditure, which made it clear that when developers take land in the future, "the time limit for paying all the land transfer price by stages should not exceed one year in principle, and special projects can be paid in full within two years, and the down payment ratio should not be less than 50% of the total land transfer price". Developers who are in arrears with the price shall not participate in new land transfer transactions. This move was called "the first punch of housing market regulation" by the media. The purpose of developers hoarding and speculating land is to obtain value-added benefits. Even if the developer pays all the land transfer fees in one lump sum, he can still hoard the land and wait for the land to appreciate. In other words, the source of the developer's hoarding land is not that he has taken it several times, but that he can share the huge profits brought by the appreciation-this huge profit even exceeds the income he earned from real estate development. Many developers in China do not build houses, but only speculate on land, which also stems from this. In fact, there is no need for another "heavy punch" to crack down on land hoarding, just strict law enforcement. As early as June, 65438+July, 0994, China promulgated the Urban Real Estate Management Law, which stipulated that land use rights should be acquired by means of transfer for real estate development. If the transfer contract expires for one year and development is not started, a land idle fee equivalent to less than 20% of the land use right transfer fee can be levied. If the development has not started for two years, the land use right can be recovered free of charge. Since then, the state has successively promulgated similar laws and regulations. However, there are more and more relevant laws, regulations and policy documents, and the phenomenon of land hoarding is increasing. The reason for hoarding land is that the law and land are "idle". If the law is strictly enforced, no developer dares to hoard land. There is a simple reason. After hoarding for two years, not only can you not enjoy the value-added income, but even the land has been recovered by the government. The developer can calculate this account. Why dare developers hoard land? Because of the connivance of the local government. So, why do local governments condone developers to hoard land? Interests make it. If the local government strictly enforces the law and punishes the developers who hoard, the enthusiasm of developers for land competition will be reduced, the land price will also rise, and the income of local governments will also be reduced. In order to maximize their own interests, local governments slowly take out land auctions, and developers take land at high prices and enjoy the benefits of appreciation. Both sides have interests and mutual benefit, forming a kind of interest. In this case, it is very unrealistic for local governments to punish those who hoard land in the same trench as themselves. So, however, with the laws and regulations flying all over the sky, there are fewer people who don't hoard land. The heavy punch of real estate regulation should be on supply. Through strict law enforcement, developers are forced to develop and build the housing supply market according to regulations. In this sense, most of the limited funds originally used by developers are used for land acquisition, which ensures the security of government land transfer income in advance, but it may further slow down the development progress of developers because of the shortage of funds. Moreover, in the context of the continuous emergence of "land kings", developers without strength are not competitive at all. After the down payment ratio increased, these developers were eliminated, further reducing the housing supply capacity-small developers are a necessary supplement to this market. At the same time, the monopoly of the industry will be strengthened, and house prices will rise further-the oil price in China is higher than that in the United States and other western developed countries, which is the inevitable result of monopoly. Today, this monopoly is rapidly spreading to the real estate sector. On the other hand, many commercial houses supplied to the market are hoarded by real estate speculators, which artificially reduces the market supply, which is an important reason for the rise in housing prices. When the second-hand house is transferred, the business tax exemption period is restored from 2 years to 5 years, which increases the floating costs. When the housing supply cannot be increased, these costs can easily be passed on to the people. Moreover, the decline in liquidity will also lead to a decline in the actual supply of housing. Obviously, these heavy punches can't really curb the rise in housing prices, because they are quietly ensuring that government revenue will not decrease first. High housing prices are the result of the interests of local governments, developers, banks and real estate speculators. As the main source of income, local governments must take the lead in lowering land prices in order to fairly squeeze the profiteering of real estate developers. Otherwise, without reducing the interests of all parties, any policy that hopes that house prices will rise will be introduced. The regulation of the real estate market must hit the nail on the head, that is, hit the benefits and hit the supply link, otherwise it will be difficult to have an effect no matter how beautiful it is, and it is more likely that the house price will be hit higher and higher by the "heavy punch". Postscript: I have no illusions about the control measures to avoid root causes and curb housing prices. The article "Inflation is around us (also talking about housing prices)" is my clearest analysis of the future trend of housing prices. Based on a large number of data and policy information in recent years, I come to the conclusion that the maximum decline that China housing prices government can tolerate should be within 20% and the time should be within 10 month. Beyond this limit, the government will inevitably introduce policies to save real estate. In 20 08, house prices just entered the downward track, and the introduction of a series of real estate rescue policies is the best proof. Therefore, unless there is an industry that can replace real estate to solve the financial gap of local governments, although house prices will be adjusted, the general trend is still rising under the impetus of the visible hand of the government, and it will continue to rise until it can't rise again under any driving force, that is, collapse. At present, the biggest problem in China is that powerful vested interests such as developers are becoming more and more powerful, which has been able to directly affect the introduction of some policies. The public can often see some senior officials in the power sector (who have a decisive role in the introduction of policies) shoulder to shoulder with developers, just like comrades. In this case, how to open the network of collusion between government and business? Who will open it? I think: whether the house price is rising or falling has become a focus of attention and debate. I think every time some policies are introduced, although the market is temporarily depressed, there will still be retaliatory rise afterwards. From 2008, at the end of 2008 and the beginning of 2009, people still thought that house prices would fall to an acceptable price, but they never thought that house prices would rise inadvertently, and it was a retaliatory rise. People can't keep up with the rhythm before they come to their senses. Many people regret that they didn't seize the opportunity at the end of the year or the beginning of the year, so I think that no matter how much the temporary adjustment can come down, the house price will still rise in the long run, so I have to seize the opportunity myself.