Japan was the only non-European and American member of the big country club before the outbreak of World War II, and it also had serious internal friction problems.

Since 1868 Meiji Restoration, Japan has gradually formed a unique bureaucratic system.

On the one hand, Lu Haijun and other military attaché s were directly subordinate to the emperor, forming a parallel relationship between military and political affairs. On the other hand, the emperor was restricted by the constitution, which substantially expanded the space for military activities. As a result, the decision-making scope of the Wenzhi government itself has been greatly compressed and weakened.

There are certain historical factors that cause the disadvantages of this system. Due to the small territory and numerous disasters, the Japanese people have formed an extremely strict hierarchy in order to survive.

Under this hierarchy, the samurai class played a very important role as the ruling tool of aristocratic lords.

However, after the Meiji Restoration, the enlightened faction in the shogunate movement gradually realized the disadvantages of the emperor's rule over Japan, and began to implement the policy of abolishing vassals and establishing counties, forcing all warriors, common people and generals in the country to be equal and no longer retaining privileges, which led to the counterattack of the conservative forces in the southwest.

1877, the southwest war broke out, and the Meiji government finally put out the rebellion in Kagoshima (formerly Samoa), but its solution to the problem was still military. Therefore, the atmosphere of overemphasizing military logic is getting worse in Japan.

In addition, the Meiji Restoration itself is a collection of learning from Britain (constitutional monarchy) in the political system and Germany (Prussia's military founding thought) in the military. This led to the defect of "virtual monarchy" in Japan's reform system and the hidden danger that the German army did not pay attention to the study of national strategy.

During the Meiji period, illiterate military commanders were mostly warriors under the old wooden model system, and the traces of cultural relics opposition were not obvious. As time goes on, the disadvantages of this system become more and more obvious. ?

/kloc-when the war broke out in 0/894, the Japanese army planned the war alone, not only failed to communicate with the civilian government in time, but even rejected the navy. After the establishment of the base camp meeting, as the head of government, Ito Bowen even had to rely on his special personal relationship with Emperor Meiji of Japan to attend smoothly. Nevertheless, Ito Bowen's method of discussing war from the political and diplomatic perspectives still caused a heated debate among Lu Haijun's aides.

During the Russo-Japanese War, most government officials had military backgrounds, and their prestige was enough to rival that of military generals. Coupled with Emperor Meiji's own ability to control the civil and military system, Japan's cooperation in diplomacy, politics and military tactics is a perfect match. ?

But this is only the personal ability of the reformists of the older generation, and it is just a fantasy after covering up the problems of the Japanese system. In the subsequent period of Emperor Taishō and Emperor Hirohito, the Japanese cabinet had unconsciously become a vassal of the army, which was quite like the Teutonic Order building a Prussian country (that is, the army owned the country).

During this period, no one in Japan's civil service system saw this. After jing yuan became prime minister, he joined forces with the Secretary of the Army, Yoshiichi Tanaka, to promote the system reform, with the intention of expanding the conquest function and getting rid of the shackles of the army.

But in the end, he was assassinated, and Tian could not speak alone.

In jing yuan's reform, he tried to give civil servants the power of overseas colonial officials, thus suppressing military power. Unexpectedly, the reform failed and the independence of the commander-in-chief was not abolished. On the contrary, it was used by overseas troops as an excuse to go its own way, and Japanese politics became more chaotic.

In fact, military chaos is not uncommon in human history. In the late Roman Empire, with the in-depth development of the recruitment system and the expansion of the garrison forces on the Danube River and the eastern line, the army gradually became an interest group with the commander group as the core. ?

Among them, Danube Group and North Africa Group influenced politics by force, which led to frequent changes of the throne. In order to get continuous support, these emperors who were helped up by the guards often promised huge military expenditures, thus forming a vicious circle.

Compared with ancient Rome, the reform of self-conscription system-the Chinese civilization in the late Tang Dynasty, which was trapped in the separatist regime of the buffer region, later fell into a chaotic situation of chaotic politics and the change of five generations.

It is precisely because of the great instability caused by military intervention in politics that the Song Dynasty formulated the national policy of "valuing literature over martial arts".

No matter in the late Roman Empire, or in the period of military chaos in the late Tang Dynasty and the Five Dynasties, there are two characteristics. On the one hand, military commanders control state affairs and exclude civilian officials from taking power; On the other hand, military forces in different regions and at different levels are constantly competing for the highest central power.

These two points are also reflected in the modern Japanese system. As mentioned earlier, after the failure of the original reform, the independence of the overseas garrison was enhanced. Therefore, the General Staff or Command, as a central organization, cannot ban local military systems. But the more serious problem is the difference between different services. ?

Service barrier is a common phenomenon. From the era of cold weapons, there were heavy infantry, heavy cavalry and light cavalry, but in modern Japan, it was mainly reflected in the competition between navy and army.

1890, American Mahan published the book Sea Power, aiming to point out a new strategic direction for the United States. After all, at that time, the United States had entered the end of the westward movement, and the North American continent was almost recovered.

The idea of sea power has greatly inspired many late-developing countries, including Germany and Japan, triggered naval competition between Britain and Germany, and even prompted Japan to develop aircraft carrier technology on a large scale after World War I.

After World War I, Lu Haijun made two different plans around the national strategy. Among them, the army believes that it should expand its troops to the north to compete with the Soviet Union, then occupy the East Asian continent, form a dual empire of land and sea, and then wait for opportunities to dominate; The navy advocates further consolidating its advantages, positioning its geographical competitor as the United States, looking for opportunities to go south to seize Guam and the Philippines, and then seize rich resources in Southeast Asia, so as to get rid of economic dependence on Europe and the United States and achieve self-sufficiency. ?

This situation makes Japan completely lose its unified national strategy, and Japan's limited resources are also occupied by Lu Haijun alone.

Moreover, many new factional struggles have emerged within the navy and the army. These include the differences between the imperial faction and the control faction of the army on whether to "downgrade" or not, and the differences between the treaty faction and the fleet faction of the navy on whether to abide by the international disarmament conference.

These differences caused great uncertainty to Japan's national strategy before World War II. It has also become the only country among the major participating countries in World War II without a clear leader.

To sum up, due to the incompleteness of the Meiji Restoration, while imitating the German military system and weakening the warrior power of the vassal countries, Japan formed a tendency of overemphasizing military logic and neglecting national strategy.

During the reign of Emperor Meiji, Ito Bowen and other reformists, these drawbacks were covered up to some extent.

However, with the passage of time, the military system intervened in the civilian government, and the differences between the big and small opposition parties in Lu Haijun and the military departments seriously weakened the overall strategic capability of Japan.

Later, the Japanese navy and army fought repeatedly over whether to attack the Soviet Union to the north or the United States to the south, but at the same time put the United States and the Soviet Union in the position of imaginary enemies.

It was even more common that the local garrison system did not listen to the central command during World War II. All these have become the inducement of Japan's foreign expansion mentality, which eventually leads to failure.