Science fiction can create extreme changes, but it is always within the scope of science, even if its form is difficult to distinguish. ..... The word "world outside science" does not simply refer to a world without science, nor does it mean that experimental science would not exist in such a world. For example, in some worlds, people will not or will not develop scientific connection with reality. "The world outside science" means that experimental science should be impossible, not unknown. ..... The leading question put forward by the super-science novel is: What should be the world where scientific knowledge cannot reach and natural science cannot be established? (P6) Why do you ask these questions? On the one hand, it is to recognize the difference between science fiction and super science fiction, on the other hand, it is to develop the imagination distinguished in science fiction, that is, super science fiction. (P7)
If I am interested in super-science novels, it is because it belongs to the origin of a very classic metaphysical problem that I have studied for a long time, that is, induction. Or, more precisely, the necessity of natural law put forward by david hume in "The Theory of Human Nature" and later "The Theory of Human Understanding". Popper claimed to be the first person to call the inductive problem "Hume's problem" and tried to give an accurate and unique answer to this question. (P7) In my opinion, Hume asked questions based on non-science fiction, while Popper is more likely to ask questions based on the imagination of science fiction. (Page 8)
Popper did not further demonstrate the unity principle of nature, but directly assumed that it was true, so he did not really face the challenge of Hume's puzzle. (P 168) In the final analysis, Hume's problem is about the stability of nature itself in the future, not about the effectiveness of natural theory in the future. (P 168- 169) Popper has clearly stated his belief in the principle of "the unity of nature": "It is absolutely impossible for an old experiment to suddenly produce new results one day. What may happen is that the results of the new experiment are contrary to the old theory. " (P 169)
Hume's question about causality is about the constancy of natural laws. It has nothing to do with whether the laws of nature are deterministic or nondeterministic, that is, it has nothing to do with the question of probability. (P 169) The key to this difficult problem is to know whether the same law, regardless of its essence, is still valid under the same environmental conditions in the future. (P 169- 170) Therefore, the problem of causality put forward by Hume should not be confused with the problem of determinism. It is a more general problem for all natural laws, and has nothing to do with the particularity of the laws. (P 170) In other words, Hume's problem is whether there is anything that can assure us that physics itself-rather than concrete and diverse physical theories-will continue to exist in the future. The condition for the establishment of physics is the repeatability of physical experiments. (P 170)
Popper's solution runs entirely in the imagination of the same origin as science fiction. (P 16) In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper clearly pointed out the difference between the problem that his theory can be falsified by "new experience" and the problem that he called "the invariance of natural processes". The latter problem is the possible change of natural laws, but it has nothing to do with theory: therefore, in our words, it involves the real Hume problem. But Popper emphasized that the latter question does not belong to falsificationism, but comes from a "metaphysical belief". Without this "belief", it is difficult to conceive "actual behavior". We have pointed out that Popper's problem (theoretical falsifiability) has never really discussed Hume's problem (probable variability of natural processes). (P 19)
This assumption that science itself will become impossible in the future is the real Hume problem. Popper's problem, that is, the problem of theoretical guarantee, is a problem of scientific fiction, and there will always be a problem of possible science and presupposition fiction in the future. However, Hume's question mobilized another kind of imagination, an imagination outside the discipline, a fiction of the world that has evolved too chaotic in the future and can no longer allow any scientific principles to be realized in reality. We can clearly see that the difference between the two fictional mechanisms-science fiction and off-wall illusion-leads to the key of true metaphysics, because Popper's misunderstanding of it confuses Popper's epistemology and Hume's ontology. (P 19-20)
Contrary to Popper, Kant did not mistake the essence of Hume's problem. He answered this question in his own universe, which is a fictional world where science is impossible. (P8) A world that leaves no room for science is no longer a world, but pure chaos and pure pluralism that does not follow any order. This is Kant's argument and his answer to Hume's question: according to the author of Critique of Pure Reason, if there is no need for law, there will be no world and perception, but only pure, unstructured and continuous pluralism. (page 27)
Kant's answer principle is this: this imaginary scene is imperceptible under any circumstances, because what makes this scene possible-the contingency of natural laws-makes all feelings and perceptions of matter impossible. (P3 1) But for Kant, perception without science is just the collapse of rational thinking: perception cannot continue to exist without science, that is, without a world that can be scientifically understood. (page 32)
If natural things no longer obey causality, everything will become a dream. In any case, we can't guarantee that we have noticed a strange phenomenon, but it is more like dreaming or indulging in fantasy. (P33) It should be emphasized that Kant's imagination that everything exists in the form of dreams is similar to Hume's imagination mobilized in the table tennis scene, that is, imagination outside science and fantasy outside the subject. As I said, Kant did not make the mistake that Popper made: he did not confuse the problem of non-science fiction with the problem of science fiction. He confronted his own concept of chaos in Hume's own territory-the reality without rules. Chaos to chaos, cinnabar to billiards: Kant's first victim of chaos is perception, which becomes an imperceptible illusion. (page 34)
However, Kant's chaos will be more intense than the chaos of the cinnabar scene he described, and therefore more intense than the chaos of Hume's billiards scene. Because according to Kant's point of view, if the law disappears there, the reality can't even maintain the dream posture ... all entities are divided internally while being created, and nothing has time to distinguish anything. Reality, after becoming as unreal as my dream, becomes more unreal than any dream, absorbing this ruined dreamer into its nothingness. There is only chaotic diversity, no perception, no texture. (page 35)
Kant can make such an assertion precisely because he applies probability calculation to our whole world, not any given phenomenon in the world. This means that it is a collectivization of possible things, giving Kant the right to assert so. But we know that since Cantor, this collectivization no longer has any logical or mathematical inevitability, that is, any transcendental inevitability. (P2 10)
At this point, Allen Badiou's masterpiece Being and Events plays a decisive role for us. Badiou affirmed the ontological application scope of Cantor's law through his own setting, and revealed that the non-totality of "what existence does" can be considered mathematically. (P202) There is a mathematical method that can clearly distinguish between contingency and coincidence, and this method is provided by the variance. (P203) Since Plato, there has never been a major chapter in the history of philosophy, focusing on reinterpreting the original alliance between philosophy and mathematics. We believe that his efforts also invisibly appeal to us to continue to reinterpret the significance of the unique connection between philosophy and mathematical discourse. (page 203)
The (quantifiable) totality of things that can be thought about cannot be thought about. (P206) We do not advocate that the non-global axiomatic system is the only possible axiomatic system. (P206) However, the fact that we can assume the truth of this axiomatic system is enough for us to abolish the validity of the corollary of inevitability, and the reason that we can continue to believe in the inevitability of physical laws will also be invalid. You know, the inevitability of physical laws is only mysteriously imposed on the fact that these laws are stable. (page 207)
The only population we have, that is, the population that can rationalize this type of probability theory, must be given to us in our universe, that is, through experience. Therefore, Kant's belief in the inevitability of law can be regarded as an ultra vires act and rejected, because it tries to extend the reasoning of probability theory beyond the boundary of experience. (page 208)
Probabilistic reasoning is based on the condition that things that can be thought about constitute "all", but this condition is only a hypothesis at best, and it is by no means an indisputable fact. (P2 1 1) We can apply Occam's razor law to the hypothesis of real inevitability: since this inevitability is an unnecessary "existence" for explaining the world, we can safely abandon it. Because even so, what we have lost is only a mystery. (P2 12)
We know that the words "coincidence" and "random" have similar meanings in etymology: "dice", "dice" or "gambling". (P2 12) Once we adopt the ontology that the total number of possible things is closed, our world must be a world subject to computing technology, which is full of aversion to gravity. (P2 13) On the contrary, the word "contingency" has the same etymology as the Latin word "arrival". In other words, what happens by accident is what comes, and only "coming" to us is the real "coming". In short, by chance, it points to a moment that will eventually come-and one more thing, it avoids all the possibility of being transcribed, and its appearance ends the vanity of the game, because in the game, everything, even the impossible, is predictable. When things come, when novelty grabs our throats, games and calculations die together-it's time to take it seriously. (P2 13)
The most critical content of all this-it also guides the intuitive understanding of existence and events-is that the most powerful concept of events that cannot be calculated and predicted is provided by a thinking that always remains mathematical, rather than artistic, poetic or religious. Only by crossing the road of mathematics can we finally eliminate the quantity with its constantly updated power and declare the end of the game. (P2 13-2 14)
For Hume, "the ultimate cause of any natural activity" must be unknowable. We may be able to sum up many principles behind countless natural phenomena into several common reasons. However, Hume insisted that "as for the reasons behind those common reasons, our exploration of them will inevitably end in failure ... these ultimate sources and principles will never be open to human curiosity and exploration." In other words, we can find the basic laws that govern the universe, but as for the reasons that support the laws themselves and give them inevitability, they will never be with us. This is equivalent to acknowledging that physical processes are indeed owned by ultimate inevitability. It is precisely because Hume agrees with this point that he can call his position a skeptical position. Because a skeptic wants to recognize the limitations of reason, it is impossible to provide a reasonable basis for us to insist on the inevitability of hypothetical truth. (P 177)
In our view, the inevitability of causality cannot be demonstrated, because there is no inevitability in causality. However, this does not mean that speculative positions can remove all obstacles. In fact, what we need to do is to rebuild Hume's problem in order to transfer the difficulties to other places. ..... If the laws are not inevitable, but accidental, then why can't their contingency be reflected through sudden and continuous changes? How can a law without an eternal foundation produce a stable world? Faced with these challenges, unlike the classical expression, this expression of Hume's puzzle actually leaves room for satisfactory solutions. This solution requires us to make no restrictions on our reasoning ability. (P 180)
We will gradually find that the causal universe, like the causal universe, is harmonious and has the same ability to explain our actual experience. But at the same time, we will find that all the mysteries in the causal universe have been emptied, and those mysteries are inseparable from the belief in physical inevitability. In other words, in the migration from causality to causal universe, we will not lose anything-except the mysteries of superstition. (P 18 1- 182)
Similar to Kant, Gandan Mayasu saved the inevitability, including the logical inevitability. But at the same time, like Hume, he also agrees that the inevitability of natural laws has no acceptable basis. May Yasu's argument-because it is really an argument-proves that only one thing is absolutely inevitable, and that is the contingency of the laws of nature.
Alan Badio