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Taiwan military intelligence bureau's spy cradle
Taiwan Province Military Intelligence Bureau spies usually need to go through a strict process of "selection" and "training" before they can really engage in extremely risky espionage work. Taiwan's "Military Intelligence Bureau" takes "specialized intelligence classes" as its external enrollment channel, and most of its personnel are selected and trained from the active officers of the Taiwan military.

In the process of receiving intelligence training, except for the "intelligence specialist class" that must receive 9 weeks of basic enlistment training, all active officers go directly to the intelligence school to receive the first phase 13 weeks of intelligence training. After the initial training, according to "personal ability and ambition", we can distinguish whether to continue to receive special training or directly serve as a junior staff officer in the Military Intelligence Bureau.

The main subjects of special training are special techniques such as intelligence gathering, intelligence differentiation, document making, cosmetic transformation and technical information. In particular, document making and cosmetic transformation are skills that cannot be learned outside the intelligence circle. In this regard, all countries in the world are classified as highly confidential, and the intelligence community in Taiwan Province Province is no exception. It can definitely be regarded as "shady technology." Among them, the document production mainly relies on special methods such as ink, code, code, writing format and letters, so that the letters sent by oneself have no intelligence evidence at all.

1a case in July 1997 can prove that "document making" of intellectual training is a highly intelligent technology. At that time, a spy from Taiwan Province Province sent an email from a country in Southeast Asia to Wenshan District. The local intelligence agency concluded that it was an intelligence package. The local postal inspection unit immediately interpreted the contents of the tape and tried to intercept the outgoing information. However, no matter what method you use, you really can't find any information on the tape except hearing the homesickness of the sender. The country's anti-intelligence agency doesn't know that the real information in this package classified as intelligence is punctuation marks recorded on the cassette and the nylon rope that wraps the mail.

Students who continue to receive special training should not only carry out special training for spies, but also carry out various special combat capabilities training. Usually, I have to go to the army special operations base in Guguan to receive basic survival training, and I have to go to the paratroopers training base in Pingtung to complete at least three skydiving trainings. Then go to the Marine Corps amphibious frogman base to receive strict underwater special operations training. At the same time, I have to go to the Marine Corps Secret Service to practice shooting all kinds of light weapons.

Of course, all students who have received intelligence training must pass the graduation exam, and only after passing the exam can they formally contact the spy intelligence business. And the subjects of graduation exams are different every year. If this year's "Military Intelligence Bureau" special agent students are required to conduct follow-up surveys of specific groups, next year may be a large-scale social survey, or the sorting and reading of intelligence materials.

The most complicated and special form of graduation examination is called "overseas comprehensive examination", which is to assess students' comprehensive information acquisition ability through overseas travel. Because this test method has certain risks, Taiwan Province's military intelligence department usually implements it after the approval of its superiors. However, judging from the actual assessment results, it is difficult for many students of the Military Intelligence Bureau to conduct investigations and obtain intelligence abroad smoothly, which also shows that the training process of military intelligence personnel in Taiwan Province is by no means "effective".

In addition, according to the regulations of Taiwan Province Military Intelligence Bureau, students receiving intelligence training are not allowed to give their real names. Everything is studied in a completely confidential and untrustworthy environment, and their ideological pressure is great. Moreover, even after leaving the intelligence system, according to the regulations, it is forbidden to travel and visit relatives on the island for three years, making the intelligence cause of the Taiwan military truly a "shameful cause."