general situation
On the night of August 20th, 1940, the divisions of Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region 129 and 120, under the unified command of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters, launched a campaign focusing on attacking Zheng Tai Railway (Shijiazhuang to Taiyuan). In order to attack the Japanese "cage policy", strive for a more favorable development of the war situation in North China, and affect the national anti-Japanese war situation, the Eighth Route Army headquarters decided to attack the Japanese traffic lines in North China. On the third day of the campaign, the number of troops participating in the war reached 104 regiment, so it was called "Hundred Regiments War". Hundred Regiments War is the largest and longest-lasting battle launched by the Eighth Route Army in North China during the stalemate in War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.
1939 Since the winter, the Japanese army has made frequent raids on the anti-Japanese base areas with railways and highways as their pillars, in an attempt to cut off the links between strategic places such as Taihang and Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, and implemented the so-called "cage policy" with railways as its pillars, highways as its chains and bunkers as its locks. The Eighth Route Army headquarters decided to launch a traffic war focusing on Zheng Tai Railway and the northern section of Tongpu Road, which effectively dealt a blow to the Japanese army in North China. Zheng Tai Railway occupies a very important position in the traffic line of North China. It crosses Taihang Mountain, which is the link connecting Pinghan and Tongpu railways, and is one of the important strategic transportation lines of Japanese army in North China. The offensive campaign of the Eighth Route Army was first launched on the Zheng Tai Railway, so it began to be called the Battle of Zheng Tai.
On July 22nd, Zhu De, Commander-in-Chief of the Eighth Route Army, Peng, Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Zuo Quan, Deputy Chief of Staff, issued the "Battle Preparation Order", which stipulated that the railway should be attacked by no less than 22 regiments. At the same time, it is required to deploy appropriate troops to carry out extensive damage to Tongpu, Pinghan, Jinpu, Beining, Texaco and other railways and some major highway trunk lines in North China, in order to cooperate with the damage to Zheng Tai railway. On August 8, Zhu De, Peng and Zuo Quan issued the "Campaign Action Order", stipulating that the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region would attack the railway stone (excluding) to the Yangquan section; 129th division attacked Yangquan-Yuci section of Zheng Tai railway; 120 Division attacked Tongpu Railway and Fen (Yang)-Li (Shi) Highway to the north of Xinxian County, and heavily blocked Japanese troops to reinforce Zheng Tai Railway in the north and south of Yangqu. All ministries are required to recapture some strongholds occupied by the Japanese army while breaking the traffic line. In these areas and communication lines, there are all three Japanese divisions, two wings of two divisions, all five independent mixed brigades, two brigades of four independent mixed brigades, two brigades 1 cavalry brigade, more than 200,000 people, 150 aircraft, about 150 puppet troops.
According to the original regulations of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters, there were no fewer than 22 regiments participating in the war. However, after the campaign, the officers and men of the Eighth Route Army and the people in the anti-Japanese base areas hated the Japanese "cage policy" and took part in the customs-breaking operation, and various ministries invested a lot of troops, including 39 regiments in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region, 129 Division (including 1 and the third column of the death squads) and 120 Division (a total of 46 regiments.
When Peng and Zuo Quan listened to the battle report in the war room of the Eighth Route Army headquarters and learned that the actual combat forces had reached 105 regiment, Zuo Quan said excitedly: "Good! This is the Hundred Regiments War. " Peng Dui said, "No matter how many regiments there are, let's call this campaign the Hundred Regiments War!"
As a result, the Battle of Zheng Tai developed into a Hundred Regiments War. This campaign has gone through two stages of active attack and one stage of anti-"mopping up".
The first stage (August 20th to September 10). The Eighth Route Army launched a general attack on Zheng Tai, Tongpu, Pinghan, Jinpu and other traffic arteries, focusing on destroying the Zheng Tai Railway. After 20 days of fighting, all the scheduled plans were completed. The tracks, bridges, tunnels, water towers and stations of the Zheng Tai Railway were all destroyed. Pinghan, Tongpu (northern section), Shide, Beining railways and major highways have also been cut off; The traffic line in North China is paralyzed.
The second stage (10 September 22nd to1early October). The task is to continue to expand the results and destroy the enemy and puppet strongholds on both sides of the traffic line and deep into the anti-Japanese base areas. During this period, our Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Military Region mainly carried out the Battle of Lai Ling, 129 Division mainly carried out the Battle of Liao Yu, and 120 Division mainly attacked Tongpu Road. In these battles, the Eighth Route Army dealt a heavy blow to the enemy. However, none of the enemy strongholds that our army planned to clear were cleared.
The third stage (10 from June 6 to 65438+the following year1October 24), the main task is to counter the retaliatory mopping-up by the Japanese and puppet troops. During this period, the Eighth Route Army successively smashed the large-scale raids of Japanese puppet troops on anti-Japanese base areas such as Taihang, Taiyue, Pingxi, Beiyue and Northwest Shanxi.
The Hundred Regiments War lasted more than five months. During the three and a half months from August 20th to February 5th, 65438, the Eighth Route Army * * fought1825th battles, and * * * killed, wounded, captured and defected to Japan, with 46480 puppet troops. Among them, the Japanese army killed or injured 356 12 people, and the puppet army killed 6,000 people; Captured 300 Japanese troops and 89,560 puppet troops; There were 47 Japanese soldiers who surrendered voluntarily with weapons, but there were 1845 puppet troops who surrendered anyway. At the same time, 5942 guns and 53 guns were seized; 474 kilometers of railways, roads 1502 kilometers, 2 bridges13, 37 railway stations and tunnels 1 1 seat were destroyed; Five coal mines and 1 1 warehouse were damaged. In addition, a large number of other military materials were seized and destroyed.
Historical evaluation:
1. Positive aspects
The Hundred Regiments War shattered the "cage policy" of the Japanese army, slowed down the pace of the Japanese army's southward advance, enhanced the confidence of the national army and civilians in winning the Anti-Japanese War, and enhanced the prestige of the China * * * Production Party and the Eighth Route Army.
2. Negative aspects
Later, some historians analyzed that the Hundred Regiments War prematurely exposed the military strength of the * * * production party, and the later "Southern Anhui Incident" also originated from this to some extent. Because during Chiang Kai-shek's official announcement of the "Second National Cooperation" to unite against Japan, it may have been deliberately reserved by the Chinese side, and the Chiang Kai-shek government only gave the Chinese side an army establishment and weapons and equipment, which is the so-called "Eighth Route Army" (the later "New Fourth Army" was compiled by guerrillas scattered in the south). Around 1938, War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression was in the most intense period. In Yan 'an, China * * * asked Chiang Kai-shek's government to send an additional division, which was directly rejected by Chiang Kai-shek. This move can be regarded as Chiang Kai-shek's intention to curb China's armament development.
The news of the victory of the Hundred Regiments War reached Chiang Kai-shek's ears, and many senior Kuomintang generals woke up like a dream and exclaimed, "How can there be more than 65,438+1,000 regiments in the northwest?" Coupled with guerrilla forces in Shandong and southern Hebei, the number is even more amazing! "In order to let the people of China see the generosity of Chiang Kai-shek's government, Chiang Kai-shek sent a commendation telegram to Yan 'an * * * Central Committee as usual, but on the other hand, he anxiously convened a military meeting of senior Kuomintang generals to urgently deploy the plan of" preventing * * * against * * * ". Since then, "fighting * * * while resisting Japan" has become the * * * understanding and consistent behavior of most officers in Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. It can be said that during the eight-year Anti-Japanese War, there was constant friction between the two sides, and the * * * production party was accompanied by the dual struggle of anti-Japanese and anti-Kuomintang "encirclement and suppression". It can be said that the development of the Hundred Regiments War directly or indirectly led to the escalation of friction between countries, which laid a hidden danger for the later "Southern Anhui Incident".
3. Tactical evaluation of Hundred Regiments War
Liu Bocheng has always advocated that troops should have regular strategic and tactical qualities and constantly develop and innovate military concepts. But Peng, who is used to guerrilla warfare, doesn't think so.
1942 On April 30th, at the forum on Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan region and related military systems, Liu Bocheng made a report on the current situation of Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan anti-Japanese democratic base areas, which comprehensively and systematically summarized the work in Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan region in the past seven years. It is inevitable to mention the issue of "Hundred Regiments War".
Liu Bocheng's report affirmed the achievements, but also bluntly pointed out the shortcomings. He believes that before and after the Hundred Regiments War, because he did not grasp the steering wheel from civil war to guerrilla warfare against Japan, he overemphasized the regular army and made the mistake of merging and letting local armed forces go unchecked, which once affected the construction of base areas. At the same time, he also pointed out that the Hundred Regiments War was a great battle to win, but there were many strategic and tactical mistakes. For example, when the enemy was outnumbered, we did not show weakness and exposed our true strength prematurely. The traditional advantages of combining regular warfare with guerrilla warfare have not been fully exerted, and some of them mean rushing into battle or even overcorrecting in order to gain political influence unilaterally.
Liu Bocheng raised these questions not for Peng's sake, but for his own work in 129 division and Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan base area.
Mao Zedong, who has always advocated independent mountain guerrilla warfare, thinks that Liu Bocheng's wrong understanding of Hundred Regiments War is accurate and appropriate. Judging from the strength of the Eighth Route Army, it is too risky to fight such a big battle. At the same time, it is also crucial that Mao Zedong has been worried that exposing his strength too early will arouse the fear of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang. In addition, he also has different views on Peng's improvisation in the Hundred Regiments War. Then, during the rectification movement, Mao Zedong handed Liu Bocheng's report to everyone for discussion.
Peng, who won the battle, certainly couldn't think of it and was completely unprepared. Later, he made some review and understanding of the strategy and tactics of the Hundred Regiments War, and the Central Committee had no objection.