Book number: 1668929
Press: Fudan University Press
Pricing: 40.0.
ISBN: 730905 135
Author: Luo Pinliang
Publication date: 2006-0 1-0 1
Version: 1
Folio: 16 In the past 30 years, the research on modern industrial organization based on game theory, business strategy and competitive market theory has made a breakthrough, which has posed a strong challenge to the structure-behavior-performance (SCP) paradigm and price theory paradigm of traditional industrial organization theory. Industrial competition and regulation and innovation of industrial organization form have become the key words of modern industrial organization. Based on the development of modern industrial organization theory, this book organically combines the traditional SCP paradigm with the basic theoretical methods of new empirical industrial organization (NEIO), and analyzes the theoretical system, basic theoretical methods and empirical research results of modern industrial organization along the basic logical system of SCP-R (Structure L- Conduction Performance-Regulation).
The basic contents of this book include market forces, non-cooperative competition, strategic interaction, innovation and regulation of industrial organization forms. Firstly, it puts forward the core issues of industrial organization-the organizational structure within the industry and the performance of industrial operation, and mainly analyzes the source and realization of market power, the efficiency loss of market power and its supervision policy. Secondly, this paper introduces the basic analysis method of this book-game theory, and analyzes it with the non-cooperative competition model of product homogeneity and product differentiation as a tool. On this basis, this book focuses on the application of dynamic R& theory to systematically study the strategic interaction behavior of enterprises, including: dynamic price competition behavior and alliance of enterprises, strategic behavior of restraining market entry, industrial chain control strategy, strategic advertising investment, R & ampd dynamic mechanism and R&D organizational form. Finally, it discusses the theory and policy of industrial organization regulation, including the welfare effect of horizontal merger and its regulation policy; The influence of network economy on traditional competitive behavior and standard competitive strategy, and the reform of network industry access system; And the industrial organization regulation policy under information asymmetry. In addition, this book also expounds the research progress of industrial organization and value modularity in industrial clusters.
The research perspective of this book is novel, and each chapter starts from the basic problems, and on the basis of explaining the basic model in a simple way, it develops from exogenous to endogenous, or from static to dynamic, or from discrete to continuous; Then, the representative frontier research and related empirical research are given, including some enlightening case studies. The research content of this book is rich, the theoretical viewpoints are innovative and forward-looking, and the case analysis has strong practical reference value.
This book is suitable for graduate students (including MBA) majoring in industrial economics, quantitative economics, management science and engineering, marketing, enterprise management and international trade, senior undergraduates majoring in economics, teachers majoring in economic management in colleges and universities, and relevant managers and researchers in enterprises and institutions. Introduction to Chapter 1
Section 1 What is an industrial organization
Section II SCP Analysis Paradigm
Section 3 Structure of the Whole Book
Chapter II Welfare Analysis of Market Forces
Section 1 Measurement of Market Power
Section 2 Sources of Market Power
Section 3 Adjustment of Social Costs and Market Forces
Section IV Empirical Research
Chapter III Monopoly Manufacturers and Dominant Manufacturers
Section 1 Decision-making of Monopoly Market
Section 2 Quality Decision of Monopoly Manufacturers
Section 3 Monopoly of Durable Goods
The fourth quarter leading manufacturers
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter IV Price Discrimination
The first part criticizes single pricing.
Section 2 Direct Price Discrimination
Section 3 Indirect Price Discrimination
Section 4 Nonlinear Pricing
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter 5 Game Theory Basis
Section 1 Basic Concepts
Non-cooperative game in the second quarter
Section III Cooperative Game
Section IV Empirical Research
Chapter VI Oligopoly Manufacturers
The first section Cournot model
Section 2 Stackelberg model
The third quarter Bertrand model
Section 4 Cournot Model with Incomplete Information
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter VII Product Differentiation
Section 1 Definition and Measurement of Product Differentiation
Section II hotelling Spatial Competition Model
Section III salop Circle Model
Section 4 Monopoly Competition
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter VIII Collusion and Dynamic Price Competition
Section 1 Cartel organizations
Section 2 Production Collusion and Trigger Strategy
Section 3 Dynamic Price Competition
Section IV Influencing Factors of Collusion
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter IX Market Entry and Anti-entry
The first part of the question.
Section 2 Entry Barriers
The third quarter into containment
The fourth quarter to increase the cost of competitors
Section 5 Predatory Pricing
Section VI Empirical Research
Chapter 10 Vertical Constraints
The first part of the question.
Section 2 Principle of Double Price Increase
Section 3 Longitudinal Constraints on Hitchhiking Behavior
Section IV Vertical Integration
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter 1 1 advertisement
The first part of the question.
Section 2 Advertising Decision Analysis
Section 3 Advertising as Quality Signal
Section 4 Welfare Effects of Advertising
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter 12 research and development
The first part of the question.
Section 2 Value Analysis of Innovation
Section 3 r&; Dynamic competition model
Section 4 Patent System and Patent Licensing
Section 5 R&D cooperation organization
Section VI Empirical Research
Chapter 13 horizontal integration
The first part of the question.
In the second quarter, the motivation of merger
Section III Welfare Effect Analysis of M&A
Section IV Supervision of Merger
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter 14 Network Externality and Standard Competition
The first part of the question.
Section 2 Network and Network Externality
Section 3 Price Competition under Network Externalities
Section 4 Compatibility and Competition of Standards
Section 5 Receiving Pricing and Supervision
Section VI Empirical Research
Chapter 15 Industrial Organization Regulation Policy under Information Asymmetry
Part one: Simplified principal-agent model.
Section II Supervision Strategies under Asymmetric Cost Information
Section III HS Operation Mode and price floor Management in Aviation Industry
The fourth quarter to alleviate traffic congestion charging system
Section V Empirical Research
Chapter 16 Research progress of industrial organization
Section 1 Introduction
Section II Industrial Clusters
Section 3 Value Modularization
Section IV Empirical Research